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 The Tribunals’ Fact-Finding Legacy 
Yvonne McDermott* 
 
Over the course of their lifetimes, the ICTY and ICTR issued judgments deciding 
on the culpability or innocence of 185 defendants.1 In reaching these judgments, 
judges assessed the evidence of hundreds of live witnesses and millions of pages 
of written evidence. In addition, Trial Chambers considered video evidence, 
maps, sketches, photographs, and judicially noticed facts from other trials 
admitted into their evidentiary records. From this ‘mosaic of evidence’,2 the 
Tribunals attempted to elucidate what had happened in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda years, sometimes decades, earlier, and to determine who bore 
responsibility for those atrocities. 
 
Matters of evidence and proof were at the very core of the Tribunals’ raison 
d’être, and were central to many of the established goals of international criminal 
law, such as contributing to lasting peace and security; fostering the rule of law 
and the protection of human rights; establishing accountability, and setting a 
historical record.3 Whilst ‘evidence and proof‘ are often mentioned together, a 
distinction can be drawn between the two interrelated concepts. According to 
                                                        
* Associate Professor of Law, Swansea University. Email: Yvonne.McDermottRees@swansea.ac.uk. 
An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Public International Law Discussion Group, 
Oxford University, in January 2018. I am grateful to Talita de Souza Dias and all present for their 
helpful comments and questions, which enhanced this chapter significantly. 
1  Key Figures of the Cases, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, online at 
http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases (last accessed 2 January 2018) (90 defendants 
sentenced; 19 acquitted); The ICTR in Brief, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, online at 
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal (last accessed 2 January 2018) (14 defendants acquitted; 62 
sentenced). 
2 Prosecutor v. Krstić, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, para. 4. 
3 The goals of the Tribunals were set out in their founding documents: UN Security Council Resolution 
827 (1993) 25 May 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), particularly preambular paras 5–7;  UN 
Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) 8 November 1994, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), particularly 
preambular paras 6–8. Whether these goals are achievable has been questioned in the literature – e.g. 
Kate Cronin-Furman and Amanda Taub, ‘Lions and Tigers and Deterrence, Oh My: Evaluating 
Expectations of International Criminal Justice’, in William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott and 
Niamh Hayes (eds) The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical 
Perspectives (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2013), 435; Immi Tallgren, ‘The Sense and Sensibility of 
International Criminal Law’ (2002) 13 EJIL 561; Mirjan R. Damaška, ‘What is the Point of 
International Criminal Justice? (2008) 83 Chicago Kent LR 329. 
Ludes and Gilbert,  ‘Proof is the result or effect of evidence, while “evidence” is 
the medium or means by which a fact is proved or disproved’.4  
 
It is fair to say that the ‘evidence’ component of evidence and proof in the ICTY 
and ICTR received the majority of scholarly attention, with a particular emphasis 
on the admissibility of evidence before these Tribunals.5  This is not unusual; the 
‘law of evidence’, as conceived in most Law Schools’ curricula and domestic 
criminal law textbooks worldwide, focuses disproportionately on admissibility 
rules and related issues of procedure.6 Much to the chagrin of some of the 
world’s leading Evidence scholars, the means of reasoning on and drawing 
conclusions from that evidence, once admitted, has been traditionally been 
excluded from teaching and scholarly analysis.7 
 
Encouragingly, towards the end of the ad hoc Tribunals’ tenures, a number of 
scholarly works began to examine such issues as the inconsistencies in 
witnesses’ accounts,8 the link between judgments’ legal and factual findings,9 and 
the potential use of argumentation schemes10 in analysing international criminal 
judgments. Policy briefs also began to examine issues of evidence and proof in 
                                                        
4 FJ Ludes and HJ Gilbert (eds), Corpus Juris Secundum: A Complete Restatement of the Entire 
American Law, Vol 31A: Evidence (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1964), 820. 
5 E.g. Peter Murphy, ‘No Free Lunch, No Free Proof: The Indiscriminate Admission of Evidence is a 
Serious Flaw in International Criminal Trials’ (2010) 8(2) JICJ 539-573; Steven Kay, ‘The Move from 
Oral Evidence to Written Evidence: ‘The Law Is Always Too Short and Too Tight for Growing 
Humankind’ (2004) 2(2) JICJ 495-502; Eugene O’Sullivan and Deirdre Montgomery, ‘The Erosion of 
the Right to Confrontation under the Cloak of Fairness at the ICTY’ (2010) 8(2) JICJ 511-538. 
6 Paul Roberts, ‘The Priority of Procedure and the Neglect of Evidence and Proof: Facing Facts in 
International Criminal Law’ (2015) 13(3) JICJ 479-506, 481.  
7 Roberts, id.; William Twining, ‘Taking Facts Seriously’ in William Twining, Rethinking Evidence 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), p. 14; Terence Anderson, David Schum and William 
Twining, Analysis of Evidence (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), p. xvii. 
8 Nancy Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010). 
9  Marjolein Cupido, ‘Facing Facts in International Criminal Law: A Casuistic Model of Judicial 
Reasoning’ (2016) 14(1) JICJ 1-20. 
10  Mark Klamberg, ‘The Alternative Hypothesis Approach, Robustness and International Criminal 
Justice: A Plea for a “Combined Approach” to Evaluation of Evidence’ (2015) 13(3) JICJ 535-553; 
Roberts (n 6); Yvonne McDermott, ‘Inferential Reasoning and Proof in International Criminal Trials’ 
(2015) 13(3) JICJ 507-533; Yvonne McDermott and Colin Aitken, ‘Analysis of Evidence in 
International Criminal Trials using Bayesian Belief Networks’ (2017) 16 Law, Probability and Risk, 
111-129; Simon De Smet, ‘Justified Belief in the Unbelievable’ in Morten Bergsmo (ed), Quality 
Control in Fact-Finding (Torkal Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Florence, 2013) 77-98. 
greater detail.11 For example, in 2017, the Case Matrix Network produced a 
report entitled, ‘Means of Proof for Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Crimes’, 
which outlines the various types of evidence that have been used to prove 
particular crimes in 20 key cases on sexual and gender-based violence.12 These 
examples illustrate that international criminal law scholarship and practice is at 
the forefront of legal inquiry, and show that the work of the Tribunals has given 
rise to a growing interdisciplinary scholarship on fact-finding.13 
 
In light of this burgeoning literature on proof in international criminal trials, this 
chapter’s modest aim is to elucidate some of the key fact-finding legacies of the 
ICTY and ICTR. Part I examines the Tribunals’ approaches to evaluating the 
evidence and elucidating the standard of proof. Part II analyses how the 
Tribunals approached issues of witness testimony, with particular reference to 
credibility issues. Part III makes some observations on the structure and 
accessibility of the Tribunals’ judgments. 
I. The Standard of Proof and the Evaluation of Evidence 
 
The ICTY and ICTR Statutes reflected the well-established principle that accused 
persons are entitled to the presumption of innocence.14 As a corollary of that 
principle, the prosecution bears the onus of proving the guilt of the accused 
beyond reasonable doubt.15 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence explicitly state 
that a conviction can be entered only when a majority of the Trial Chamber is 
satisfied that guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.16 
 
                                                        
11 International Bar Association, Evidence Matters in ICC Trials (IBA, The Hague, 2016); Human 
Rights Center, Digital Fingerprints: Using Electronic Evidence to Advance Prosecutions at the 
International Criminal Court (Human Rights Center, Berkeley, 2014). 
12 Case Matrix Network, Means of Proof: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Crimes (Centre for 
International Law Research and Policy, Belgium, 2017) 
13 Roberts (n 6) 481 (referring to ICL’s ‘holistic disciplinary vision’.) 
14 Article 21(3), ICTY Statute; Article 20(3), ICTR Statute. 
15 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, 1 June 2001, para. 107; 
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Decision on the Prosecution’s Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial 
Chamber’s 10 April 2003 Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 28 
October 2003, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt, para. 14 (noting that the prosecution ‘carries 
the onus of proof… A basic right of the accused enshrined in the Tribunal’s Statute is that he or she is 
innocent until proven guilty by the prosecution.’) 
16 Rules 87(A), ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE.  
Whilst the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is notoriously difficult to 
define,17 some Chambers of the Tribunals have attempted to provide some 
clarity as to its meaning. In Delalić, for example, the ICTY Trial Chamber drew 
heavily on common law jurisprudence, quoting Lord Denning’s definition that 
proof beyond reasonable doubt ‘need not reach certainty but it must carry a high 
degree of probability… [it] does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt’.18 
The Chamber also recalled Australian Chief Justice Barwick’s particularized 
notion of the reasonable doubt standard, which defined a reasonable doubt as 
any doubt that the jury entertains, which the jury members themselves deem to 
be reasonable in the circumstances.19 The Chamber added little commentary to 
these quotes, simply noting that they clearly showed that the burden of proof 
rested with the prosecution. 20  In Rutaganda, the ICTR Appeals Chamber 
emphasized the need for any doubts, in order to be reasonable, to be founded on 
solid evidentiary and logical bases, noting that: 
 
The reasonable doubt standard in criminal law cannot consist in 
imaginary or frivolous doubt based on empathy or prejudice. It must be 
based on logic and common sense, and have a rational link to the 
evidence, lack of evidence or inconsistencies in the evidence.21 
 
The ICTR Appeals Chamber in Ngirabatware and the ICTY Appeals Chamber in 
Mrkšić took what could be described as the ‘alternative hypothesis’ approach to 
the standard of proof.22 Both noted that the standard of proof required the 
Chamber to be satisfied that there is no alternative reasonable explanation of the 
evidence (other than the guilt of the accused) before it can enter a conviction.23  
 
                                                        
17 In England and Wales, judges have tried to refrain, insofar as possible, from providing instructions to 
jury its definition: e.g. R v. Yap Chuan Ching (1976) 63 Cr App Rep 7, para. 11. See also Federico 
Picinali, ‘The Threshold Lies in the Method: Instructing Jurors about Reasoning Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt’ (2015) 19(3) Int. J. of Evidence & Proof 139-153. 
18 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, para. 600, citing 
Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 1 All ER 372, 373-4. 
19 Delalić et al. Trial Judgment, ibid, para. 600, citing Green v. R (1972) 46 AJLR 545. 
20 Delalić et al. Trial Judgment, ibid, para. 601. The Chamber further noted that these principles they 
established would be borne in mind when examining the culpability of the accused: ibid, para. 604. 
21 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, 26 May 2003, para. 488. 
22 Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (Routledge, London, 1991), at 32–38; De Smet (n 
10), 89–91; Klamberg (n 10), 535. 
23 Ngirabatware v. Prosecutor, Judgment, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, 18 December 2014, para. 20; 
Prosecutor v. Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, 5 May 2009, para. 220. 
Thus, a number of principles on the meaning of the standard of proof can be 
derived from the case law of the tribunals. First, proof beyond reasonable doubt 
requires a high degree of probability, although precisely what level of probability 
is required seems to differ between judges. Judge Antonetti in Seselj opined that 
proof beyond reasonable doubt requires ‘virtual certainty’,24 an approach 
apparently at odds with that of the Appeals Chamber in Delalić, cited above.25 
 
Second, if there is an alternative reasonable explanation of the evidence that 
suggests innocence, the Chamber must acquit the defendant. It need not be 
convinced of the innocence of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; 26 all that is 
required is that the judges themselves deem their doubt to be reasonable,27 and 
that doubt should be based on common sense, logic, and be linked to the 
evidence on the record, or the absence thereof.28 
 
In addition, the Tribunals have confirmed that the standard of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt applies not just to the ultimate issue of the culpability of the 
accused, but also to ‘each and every element of the offences charged’.29 In 
Kupreškić, the prosecution argued that the Trial Chamber had erred by applying 
the standard of proof to a particular witness’s testimony.30 The Appeals Chamber 
dismissed this argument, noting that the conviction of the defendants for 
persecution hinged on this witness’s account, and thus the Trial Chamber was 
correct in assessing their testimony to the standard of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt.31  
 
                                                        
24  Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Judgment, Case No. IT-03-67-T, 31 March 2016, Concurring Opinion of 
Presiding Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti Attached to the Judgment, p. 149. The majority in Šešelj (of 
which Judge Antonetti was a member), appeared to take such an approach at para. 192 of the 
Judgment, where it noted that it had not received ‘sufficient evidence to irrefutably establish the 
existence of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population’. To ‘irrefutably 
establish’ a matter is arguably a higher standard of proof than that of proving it ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’. 
25 See above, text to n. 18.  
26  This point is made, in the context of appeals on questions of fact, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 
Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, 1 June 2001, para. 178. 
27 Delalić et al Trial Judgment (n 18), para. 600 
28 Rutaganda Judgment (n 23), para. 488. 
29 Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Judgment, Case No. IT-06-90-T, 15 April 2011, para. 14.  
30 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-95-16-A, 23 October 2001, para. 226 
31 Id. 
Similarly, the ICTR Appeals Chamber dismissed a prosecution argument that the 
Trial Chamber committed an error of law in employing the standard of proof to 
assess individual items of testimony.32 In that case, a witness had testified that 
he had attended a meeting, where he heard the accused Ntagerura say that ‘the 
fate of the Tutsi will be sealed’.33 In light of the fact that there were issues with 
this witness’s credibility, and his allegations were uncorroborated, the Trial 
Chamber concluded that it could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that 
Ntagerura had taken part in the meeting.34 The Appeals Chamber found no error 
in this approach.35 While it noted that to apply the criminal standard of proof to 
each piece of evidence would be an error,36 it drew a distinction between pieces 
of evidence and the elements of the crimes that those pieces of evidence purport 
to prove.37 The standard of proof applies to each fact upon which a conviction is 
based.38 Therefore, if there is only one piece of evidence to support a relevant 
fact, as was the case in Kupreškić,39 the Chamber must assess whether it is 
convinced of the existence of that fact beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
I have written elsewhere on the two approaches to the evaluation of the 
evidence – namely, the ‘holistic’ and ‘atomistic’ approaches – that judges may 
choose from in assessing the evidence.40 An early decision in Tadić appeared to 
argue against a purely atomistic assessment of each piece of evidence: 
 
[A] tribunal of fact must never look at the evidence of each witness 
separately, as if it existed in a hermetically sealed compartment; it is the 
accumulation of all the evidence in the case which must be considered. 
The evidence of one witness, when considered by itself, may appear at 
                                                        
32 Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Judgment, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, 7 July 2006, para. 168. 
33 Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Judgment and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, 25 February 2004, para. 
114.  
34 Ibid., para. 118. 
35 Ntagerura Appeal Judgment (n 32), para. 173 
36 Ibid., para. 174. 
37 Ibid., para. 175.  
38 Id. Similar findings were made at paras. 195-197, ibid. 
39 See above, text to n 30 and n 31. 
40 Yvonne McDermott, ‘Strengthening the Evaluation of Evidence in International Criminal Trials’ 
(2017) 17 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 682-702, 687-692. This distinction borrows heavily from US Evidence 
scholarship, e.g. Michael S. Pardo, ‘Juridical Proof, Evidence, and Pragmatic Meaning: Toward 
Evidentiary Holism’ 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. (2000-2001) 399. 
first to be of poor quality, but it may gain strength from other evidence in 
the case. The converse also holds true.41 
 
On the other hand, a number of appeals, where one party asserts that the Trial 
Chamber has taken an insufficiently holistic approach to the evidence ‘as a 
whole’, have been unsuccessful.42 In Bizimungu, where defence argued that the 
Trial Chamber had failed to make the requisite findings to underpin his 
convictions, the prosecution countered that such findings could be read 
holistically from the judgment as a whole.43 The prosecution argument was 
rejected by the Appeals Chamber, which found that the Trial Chamber’s failure to 
set out its findings amounted ‘to a manifest failure to provide a reasoned 
opinion’.44 
 
Both the atomistic and holistic approaches have their critics,45 and it is clear that 
neither a purely atomistic evaluation of each piece of evidence, nor a purely 
holistic approach, is preferable. Thus, a combined approach is needed. To this 
end, Mark Klamberg has argued that international criminal judges take the 
following steps in reaching their conclusions: first, they evaluate a single piece of 
evidence; then, they weigh the totality of evidence in favour of or against the 
proposition asserted, and then, they make the final determination of whether the 
combined evidential value is sufficient to establish the proposition.46 
 
This may be a rather optimistic view of how evidence is evaluated in practice in 
international criminal trials. Indeed, one of the very few judicial statements on 
how the evaluation of evidence works in practice suggests otherwise.47 The 
Ntagerura Appeals Chamber set out the following three stages that are taken in 
the evaluation of the evidence.48 Firstly, an assessment of the credibility of the 
evidence is undertaken, but the Chamber explicitly said that ‘this cannot be 
                                                        
41 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, Case 
No. IT-94-1-A-R77, 31 January 2000, para. 92.  
42 E.g. Ntagerura and Kupreškić, discussed above, text to n 30 – n 39. 
43 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-99-50-A, 4 February 2013, paras. 14-15. 
44 Ibid., para. 29. 
45 Outlined in detail in McDermott (n 40), pp. 687-689. 
46 Klamberg (n 10), 546-547.  
47 Ntagerura Appeal Judgment (n 32), para. 174. 
48 Id. 
undertaken by a piecemeal approach’. Secondly, the Chamber assesses whether 
the evidence presented by the prosecution ‘should be accepted as supporting the 
existence of the facts alleged’, notwithstanding the defence evidence.49 Thirdly, 
the Chamber will analyse whether all of the elements of the crimes and modes of 
liability charged have been proven.50  
 
The Ntagerura approach differs from Klamberg’s proposed approach in two 
important respects. First, in relation to the first limb, the Chamber’s insistence 
that individual pieces of evidence should only be assessed in light of the rest of 
the evidentiary record, while broadly correct, misses an important role of the 
Chamber in analysing the reliability and relevance of each piece of evidence on 
its own merits. If a piece of evidence is patently lacking in reliability, the fact that 
another (perhaps equally unreliable) piece of evidence corroborates that 
evidence is irrelevant. Thus, there is clearly an important need for the ‘piecemeal 
approach’ maligned by the Appeals Chamber’s exposition of the first stage to be 
taken, followed by a contextual evaluation of that evidence in the light of other 
evidence on the record. In the ICTR’s stated approach, Klamberg’s first two 
proposed stages are condensed and reduced to a single step of analysing the 
evidence as a whole. Second, the Chamber’s adds an important step to 
Klamberg’s approach in its third limb, which sees the application of facts (or, in 
Klamberg’s terms, propositions) to the elements of the crimes and modes of 
liability charged. 
 
Optimistic though it may be, Klamberg’s approach illustrates a good model of 
how the process of evaluation of evidence should work. Combining the differing 
tests outlined above might lead us to a new, four stage, test for the evaluation of 
evidence: 
1. The examination of a single piece of evidence on a particular fact; 
2. The evaluation of that evidence in the context of other evidence on the 
record; 
                                                        
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
3. The weighing of the totality of the evidence to determine whether the fact 
is established. If that fact is an element of the crime or the mode of 
liability charged, then it must be established beyond reasonable doubt;51 
4. An examination of whether the fact proven, and other relevant facts 
established, ensure that all of the elements of the crimes and modes of 
liability charged have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
These guidelines on the assessment of evidence, whilst perhaps incomplete, 
provide a starting point for future international criminal trials in approaching 
how they weigh the evidence before them. This would certainly be preferable to 
the position of the ICTY and ICTR, where it has been argued that ‘the absence of 
clear guidelines on the weighing of evidence… furthers the freedom of 
assessment; but it achieves this objective at the expense of legal certainty.’52 The 
approach proposed above would enable Chambers to incorporate both a 
thorough scrutiny of each piece of evidence, and an evaluation of that evidence in 
the context of the record as a whole.  
II. Evaluating Witness Credibility  
 
While the above suggested framework stresses the importance of carrying out an 
individualised assessment of the evidence presented, the Tribunals’ judgments 
often emphasised a rather more holistic approach. A common statement made in 
judgments was that the Trial Chamber considered all of the evidence presented 
before it, and that even if a piece of evidence was not cited in the judgment, the 
parties could be assured that it had been duly considered and given weight to by 
the Chamber.53 This type of statement can give rise to uncertainty as to the 
precise evidentiary basis of some of the Chamber’s conclusions.  
                                                        
51 Id. Some judgments have used the term ‘material fact’ to describe those facts that must be proven 
beyond reasonable doubt: Delalic et al. Trial Judgment (n 18), para. 109; Prosecutor v. Halilović, 
Judgment, Case No. IT-01-48-A, 16 October 2007, para. 109; Prosecutor v. Martić, Judgment, Case 
No. IT-95-11-A, 8 October 2008, para. 55; Prosecutor v. Miloševič (Dragomir), Judgment, Case No. 
IT-98-29/1-A, 12 November 2009, para. 20; Prosecutor v. Mladić, Judgment, Case No. IT-09-92-T, 22 
November 2017, para. 5250. 
52  Paul Behrens, ‘Assessment of International Criminal Evidence: The Case of the Unpredictable 
Génocidaire’ (2011) 71(4) Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 661-689. 
53 This statement is found in, inter alia, Prosecutor v. Perišić, Judgment, Case No. IT-04-81-T, 6 
September 2011, para. 23; Gotovina Trial Judgment (n 29), para. 47; Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Judgment, 
 Similarly, the manner in which witnesses’ credibility or reliability was assessed 
was not always explicit. On occasion, the Tribunals noted that they adjudged 
certain witnesses to be unreliable on some points, but reliable on others.54 For 
example, in Gotovina, the ICTY Trial Chamber noted: 
 
Some of the witnesses… were evasive or not entirely truthful… Although 
aware of this, the Trial Chamber nevertheless sometimes relied on some 
aspects of these witnesses’ testimonies... While the Trial Chamber may not 
always have explicitly stated whether it found a witness’s testimony or 
portions of his or her testimony credible, it consistently took the factors [of 
credibility, reliability, and demeanour] into account in making findings on the 
evidence.55 
 
In other words, even where the Chamber has not explicitly stated whether or 
why it found a witness’s testimony, or part of that testimony, credible or reliable, 
it will have made that determination and based its overall judgment on that 
undisclosed assessment. These ‘catch all’ provisions made it almost impossible 
for one of the parties to appeal on the basis that the Trial Chamber made an 
error of fact.56 
 
Nevertheless, while the Tribunals were given the freedom to assess the evidence 
without constraint to any approach derived from national rules of evidence,57 a 
number of preferences and reasonably consistent principles on issues such as 
corroboration, credibility, and reliability emerged in practice. For example, 
despite the increase over time in rules of evidence that allowed for a greater use 
of written witness statements in lieu of oral testimony,58 Trial Chambers 
                                                                                                                                                              
Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, 2 December 2008, para. 29; Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, Judgment, 
Case No. IT-03-69, 30 May 2013, para. 34. 
54 Perišić Trial Judgment, ibid., para. 10; Prosecutor v. Đorđević, Judgment, Case No. IT-05-87/1-T, 
23 February 2011, para. 18; Prosecutor v. Strugar, Judgment, Case No. IT-01-42-T, 31 January 2005, 
para. 10. 
55 Gotovina Trial Judgment (n 29), para. 31.  
56 Discussed further in Yvonne McDermott, ‘The ICTR’s Fact-Finding Legacy: Lessons for the Future 
of Proof in International Criminal Trials’ (2015) 20(3) Criminal Law Forum 351-372, where it is 
argued that apparent alleged errors of fact are often framed as alleged errors of law to further their 
chance of success on appeal.  
57 Rule 89, ICTR RPE; Rule 89, ICTY RPE.  
58 See the references cited above (n 5) for further discussion.  
continued to express a preference that important evidence be elicited orally from 
witnesses in court.59  
 
In assessing the credibility of witnesses, both the ICTY and ICTR have borne in 
mind that witnesses’ memories may be affected by the passage of time60 and the 
trauma suffered.61 In addition, some Chambers have quite frankly acknowledged 
that the witnesses who have appeared before them may not have been entirely 
truthful in their accounts. 62  This may be because of the witness’s own 
involvement in the events at issue, and their attempts to downplay their own 
culpability.63  Such ‘insider witnesses’ are frequently used in international 
criminal trials; at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, for example, 31% of 
witnesses were classified as insider witnesses.64 Other witnesses may have had 
other underlying motives or affiliations that cast doubt on their credibility or 
reliability;65 a number of Chambers noted that issues such as the witnesses’ 
connections with the accused, the prosecution, national governments, or 
survivors’ groups would be noted in the evaluation of their testimony.66  
 
The ICTR Trial Chamber in Akayesu established some guidelines on assessing the 
credibility of witnesses. It noted that cultural factors may lead to some 
                                                        
59 E.g. Gotovina Trial Judgment (n 29), para. 16; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-
4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 137. 
60 Strugar Trial Judgment (n 54), para. 7; Mladić Trial Judgment (n 51), para. 5279; Prosecutor v. 
Bagilishema, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, 7 June 2001, para. 24, and ibid., Separate and 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mehmet Güney, para. 29; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Judgment, Case No. 
ICTR-95-1A-A, 3 July 2002.  
61 Akayesu Trial Judgment (n 59), paras. 142-143; Bagilishema Trial Judgment, ibid., Separate and 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Güney, para. 30; Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-
17/1-T, 10 December 1998, para. 113; Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-A, 20 
February 2001, para. 497; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-23-A, 12 June 2002, 
para. 324. For further analysis on this point, see Robert Cryer, ‘A Message from Elsewhere: Witnesses 
before International Criminal Tribunals’ in Paul Roberts and Mike Redmayne (eds), Innovations in 
Evidence and Proof (Hart, Oxford, 2007) 381-400 and Robert Cryer, ‘Witness Evidence Before 
International Criminal Tribunals’ (2003) 3 Law and Practice of International Tribunals 411-439. 
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63 Mladić Trial Judgment (n 51), para. 5280; Gotovina Trial Judgment (n 29), para. 31.  
64 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Best Practice Recommendations for the Protection and Support of 
Witnesses (SCSL, Freetown, 2008), p. 11. A study of ICTY witnesses, Echoes of Testimonies, was 
published in October 2016, but despite gathering information on the ethnicity, age, and gender of 
witnesses surveyed, the study did not classify the witnesses by background and role in the matters on 
which they testified.  
65 Mladić Trial Judgment (n 51), para. 5279; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Judgment, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 30 
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66 Bizimungu Trial Judgment (n 62), para. 109. 
witnesses’ difficulty in providing specific details on issues such as distances, 
times, and locations, and that the Chamber did not draw adverse inferences from 
witnesses’ ‘reticence and their circuitous responses to questions’.67 The Chamber 
stated that challenges on the credibility of the witness must be individualized to 
the particular witness – it was insufficient to merely assert that other witnesses 
for the party had been found to have lied – and that such challenges must be put 
to the witness themselves, giving them the chance to respond.68 
 
In spite of this extrapolation of some of the factors that Chambers will take into 
account in assessing witness credibility, whether and why a Chamber will deem 
a witness credible still remains quite uncertain. At times, the ICTY and ICTR 
Chambers appear to have based these assessments on the judges’ own beliefs on 
how people should normally behave, albeit in the extraordinary circumstances 
that witnesses have found themselves in. In Nzabonimana, for example, the ICTR 
noted that it was ‘unlikely that a group of Tutsis fleeing a violent attack at their 
place of refuge … would choose to disguise themselves as Hutus and join a group 
of people gathered in a trading centre for a brief time before continuing on their 
journey.’69 In Gatete, the fact that a witness ‘moved to only metres away from the 
Accused at the roadblock when Interahamwe, who according to her testimony 
had killed persons with “bladed weapons”, were present’ led the Chamber to 
have concerns about the merits of the witness’s evidence.70 These assessments 
suggest that the ICTR Chambers believed they could accurately predict how 
people ought to behave when fleeing genocidal attackers, and that any 
derogation from that norm was to be viewed with suspicion.  
 
This importation of the judges’ own expectations of human behavior in the face 
attack of seems curious, given the exceptional nature of the atrocities upon 
which the ICTR adjudged. The ICTY was not immune from making similar 
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cultural transplantations. In Tadić, the defence argued that the Trial Chamber 
had erred by relying on the testimony of a witness who claimed to have seen the 
events when he returned to his home to check on his pet pigeons.71 The 
Prosecution had responded by likening his actions to the pet owner who returns 
to a burning building to rescue their beloved companion.72 The Appeals Chamber 
seemingly accepted this argument, noting:  
 
The Appeals Chamber does not accept as inherently implausible the 
witness’ claim that the reason why he returned to the town where the 
Serbian paramilitary forces had been attacking, and from which he had 
escaped, was to feed his pet pigeons. It is conceivable that a person may 
do such a thing, even though one might think such action to be an 
irrational risk.73 
 
However, as Paul Roberts has noted, the transcripts reveal that the witness was 
motivated by other factors than the welfare of his pigeons, including his need to 
get food and clothes, and to locate his brother.74 Roberts questions whether the 
parties, and the Chamber in turn, projected their (perhaps particularly Western) 
view of the relationship between pets and their owners in evaluating this issue.75   
 
The extent to which a witness’s account is corroborated is clearly a relevant 
factor in the Chamber’s decision on whether to base its findings on that account. 
That being said, the Tribunals were not bound by the ‘unus testis, nullus testis’ 
rule – in other words, there was no legal requirement of corroboration for the 
testimony of a single witness to be accepted as evidence.76 However, the ICTY 
and ICTR consistently emphasized that uncorroborated accounts would be 
treated with caution.77 Corroboration is particularly important where a witness’s 
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statement has been entered in written form in lieu of oral testimony.78 In 
Popović, the ICTY Appeals Chamber emphasized that findings on material facts 
could not be based solely or decisively on untested written statements, and that 
such accounts must be corroborated.79 Conversely, the fact that many witnesses 
may corroborate one another does not necessarily prove the credibility of their 
accounts.80 
 
The weight to be placed on the witness’s identification of the accused was a 
contentious issue in both the ICTY and ICTR. In Tadić, a distinction was drawn 
between so-called ‘identification witnesses’, to whom the accused was 
previously unknown by sight, and ‘recognition witnesses’, who knew the accused 
prior to the relevant events and recognised them as a result.81 A stricter standard 
of assessment will apply to the evidence of the former category of witness.82 
However, the distinction between identification witnesses and recognition 
witnesses can be difficult to draw – in Lukić, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that 
prior knowledge of the accused before the commission of a crime was not a 
prerequisite to being classified as a recognition witness; the fact that the witness 
got to know what the accused looked like over the period of the commission of 
that crime was sufficient for them to be considered recognition witnesses.83  
 
While in-court identification of the accused is generally permissible,84 little 
weight should be placed on such evidence; the fact that the defendant will be 
sitting next to guards in the courtroom will necessarily suggest to the witness 
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that this is the person on trial.85 However, a witness’s inability to identify the 
accused in court may be relevant in refusing to rely on that witness’s 
identification evidence.86 In Kupreškić, the Trial Chamber placed particular 
weight on the fact that a witness’s ‘evidence concerning the identification of the 
accused was unshaken.’87 The Appeals Chamber, recalling that a confident 
demeanour is often a character trait, rather than an indication of truthfulness,88 
found that the Trial Chamber had erred in relying so heavily on this witness’s 
account.89 
 
The above analysis shows that the Tribunals’ approach to the evaluation of 
witness testimony was still evolving by the end of their tenures. Whilst some 
general principles and themes have been identified, practice was generally quite 
inconsistent on the weight to be given to different types of evidence and the 
extent to which some Chambers accepted or declined to accept fallibilities in 
witnesses’ accounts.90 The common statements to be found in Trial Judgments 
that all evidence, even where not cited, was considered often obfuscated the 
precise impact of testimonial deficiencies or issues of credibility that the 
Chambers identified. This observation leads us to examine the structure and 
layout of judgments and whether they detract from those judgments’ clarity and 
accessibility. 
III. The Structure of Judgments 
 
It is a truism that international criminal judgments are exceptionally lengthy, 
and that is particularly true for the judgments of the ad hoc tribunals.91 Some of 
the last judgments issued by the ICTY and ICTR before they ceased operations 
demonstrate this fact; the Mladić Trial Judgment, issued in November 2017, 
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spans five volumes and is over 2,500 pages long, plus a confidential annex.92 
Similarly, the Karadzić trial judgment is over 2,600 pages.93 Even Appeals 
Chamber judgments can span over 1,000 pages.94 This length of judgment was 
not always common; the ICTY’s Trial Chamber 1999 judgment in Aleksovski was 
just 90 pages long, although that judgment concerned the accused’s 
responsibility for just three crimes alleged to have been committed over a period 
of less than six months.95 
 
The length of judgments does raise concerns for the accessibility of the 
Tribunals’ findings to the communities affected by the atrocities on trial, as well 
as to the international and legal community. Assuming an ability to read 200 
pages per day of the often highly complex and technical legal language used in 
judgments, it would take the average reader close to two weeks to read the 
Karadžić judgment alone.  The ability to absorb 200 pages in a day would require 
most people to dedicate themselves solely to the task of reading the judgment, a 
luxury that many would be unable to afford.  
 
Ironically, perhaps, the huge scope of the judgments could be attributed, at least 
in part, to the expectation of setting an historical record, or, in the words of Judge 
Nsereko, establishing ‘undisputable findings regarding the atrocities 
committed’.96 For example, in reading the Karadžić judgment, one aspect that 
really stands out is the shocking consequences of DutchBat’s loss of control, and 
their role in actually enabling the genocide in Srebrenica.97 The extensive 
treatment of this issue is in a sense understandable, given that it forms an 
important part of the record of how this genocide happened. On the other hand, 
one could strongly argue that the failings of DutchBat have precisely nothing to 
do with Karadžić’s criminal liability. Given that the DutchBat findings do not 
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appear until 2000 pages in to the judgment, one might wonder about the 
accessibility of these important factual findings. It could be more useful for all 
concerned if the Chamber released a separate document on ‘context of the 
crimes’ for these important factual findings, with the judgment itself limited to 
the specific elements of the crimes and modes of liability charged, and how the 
evidence supported those elements.  
 
A more focused judgment may also lead to less repetition; again, in Karadžić, one 
of the key aspects of the case was a phone conversation that the accused had 
with Deronjić, which was crucial in proving the accused’s knowledge that the 
detainees would be killed. The Trial Chamber judgment includes a full transcript 
of this conversation at paragraphs 5311, 5710, and 5772, and it is quoted at 
length again at paragraph 5805 and 5806. 
 
These issues of accessibility and clarity came to the fore when I wrote, together 
with a Computer Scientist colleague with expertise in argumentation theory,98 an 
amicus curiae brief submitted to the MICT Appeals Chamber in Karadžić.99 As 
part of a wider project, which examines the potential applicability of 
argumentation schemes to international criminal judging, we took the Trial 
Chamber’s findings on Karadžić’s genocidal intent as a case study.100 These 
findings were the subject of an extensive and rather unprecedented level of 
academic scrutiny.101 In order to construct a relatively straightforward four-page 
timeline of relevant events, findings spanning over 600 paragraphs had to be 
drawn upon.102 It occurred to us that the inclusion of a timeline or timelines, 
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More generally, as alluded to in part II above, it might also be useful if judgments 
could indicate more clearly the probative value of witnesses’ testimony and 
other evidence. One interesting aspect of Judge Antonetti’s separate opinion in 
Šešelj was the inclusion of a table on the probative value of witness’s evidence 
and on the exhibits admitted to the record. In these tables, Judge Antonetti 
assigned levels of probative value on a seven-point scale.103 The scale adopted 
bears some similarities to scales familiar in the science of logic – such as the 
admiralty scale, or ‘NATO system’, for the evaluation of particular intelligence 
sources and the level of confidence in the information.104 Even if this kind of 
evaluation of evidence using scales and metrics were not included in judgments, 
they may be useful in the judgment drafting process. Such analyses could in turn 
feed into charts or tables setting out the elements of each crime and whether 
they had been proven or not. While some judges would almost certainly object to 
a more atomistic overview of why the Chamber was brought to its final 
conclusion, it would clearly be preferable to the Tribunals’ approach whereby 
readers are assured that the decisions were based on the evidentiary records as 
a whole, and that even where evidence was not explicitly cited, it will have been 
considered.105  As one author has argued, ‘The courts’ judgments do not 
consistently clarify which facts underlie the decisions, what weight is attached to 
these facts and how this factual evaluation relates to the legal framework of 
rules, elements, criteria and precedents.’106 
 
A final structural element of the Tribunals’ judgments that is worthy of 
consideration is the not uncommon practice of judges in the majority appending 
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joint concurring opinions or separate opinions to judgments. In other words, the 
judgment sees two of the three judges (or three out of five judges, for Appeals 
Chamber decisions) form a majority, with a dissenting opinion from the 
remaining judge or judges. In addition to that dissenting opinion and majority 
judgment, one or more of the judges from the majority appends a separate, often 
lengthy, concurring opinion, emphasizing precisely why they agree with the 
majority (i.e. their own) judgment.  
 
For example, in Bagilishema, Judge Asoka de Z. Gunawardana, who was in the 
majority, issued a separate opinion that began with the words ‘I agree with the 
Judgment of Judge Møse…’.107 This type of wording may give the impression that 
the majority judgment was not truly a reflection of the views of the majority, but 
of one of the judges in that majority. Similarly, in Šešelj, as well as the 110-page 
long judgment,108 Judge Niang, who was in the majority, appended a six-page 
long ‘individual statement’,109 whilst Judge Antonetti, who was also in the 
majority, issued a ‘concurring opinion’ spanning almost 500 pages in length.110 
Judge Lattanzi’s ‘partially dissenting’ opinion (although she noted that she 
disagreed with her colleagues in the majority on ‘almost everything’111) was 49 
pages long.112 This practice of separate majority opinions highlights discord 
amongst judges, adds further conceptual confusion on the precise basis for the 
majority judgment, and has the potential to dilute the normative force of the 
judgment, which is supposed to be the definitive statement of the majority’s 
conclusions. Nevertheless, it is a practice that has permeated into other 
international criminal jurisdictions, including, most notably, the International 
Criminal Court.113  
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IV. Conclusion 
 
This chapter drew on the rich and varied jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR in 
enunciating some of the key themes that underpinned their fact-finding 
practices. It provided some suggestions on how the standard of proof could be 
more clearly articulated, how the evaluation of evidence could be made more 
explicit, and how international criminal judgments could be made more 
accessible, drawing on the experience of the ICTY and ICTR. The increased 
accessibility and clarity that would result would in turn enhance the legal and 
sociological legitimacy of future international criminal trials.  
 
On the meaning of the standard of proof, Part I concluded that the standard of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt applies not just to the Chamber’s ultimate 
conclusion, but also to key facts underpinning the elements of crimes or modes 
of liability, and that if an alternative reasonable explanation of the evidence 
exists, the Chamber must acquit the accused. Part I also noted that there was 
some uncertainty or apparent differences of opinion between judges on the 
precise level of certainty required to reach the standard of proof. It also 
compared the atomistic and holistic approaches to the evaluation of the 
evidence, and proposed a model of evaluation that would combine both 
approaches.  
 
Relatedly, Part II criticised the Chambers’ often overly holistic approach to the 
evaluation of evidence, as illustrated by the common statement found in 
judgments that says that all of the evidence, even if it was not referred to in the 
judgment, was duly weighed and considered in reaching judgment. Part II also 
extrapolated principles on some of the more contentious issues that arose on the 
assessment of evidence in practice, such as the role of corroboration; the weight 
to be given to in-court identifications of the accused, and the factors to be taken 
into account in deciding whether a witness should be considered credible. 
Nevertheless, it was noted that the level of credibility a Chamber would attach to 
a witness’s account was rather unpredictable, and the factors relied upon by 
Chambers in this regard appeared to vary quite significantly between differently-
constituted Chambers.  
 
Lastly, Part III discussed the structure of international criminal judgments. It 
noted that the extreme length of the ICTY and ICTR’s judgments could have an 
impact on their accessibility to the local, international, and legal communities 
that they serve. It made some suggestions for minor improvements that could 
have made the Tribunals’ judgments much more focused and navigable. Part III 
also suggested that the practice of judges appending joint concurring opinions to 
the majority judgment might detract from the normative force of the original 
judgment.  
 
Of course, it could be argued, from the point of view of sociological legitimacy, 
that victims in affected regions are more interested in the outcome of 
international criminal trials and the sentences given to convicted persons than 
they are in reading the full judgments and determining the evidentiary 
underpinnings of the Tribunals’ findings. That argument would suggest that 
judgments only serve prosecution and defence legal teams and the occasional 
interested academic, and that there is no need for the Tribunals to make their 
findings more broadly accessible. I would respectfully disagree with such an 
argument for two reasons. First, practice shows us that affected communities do 
care about the Tribunals’ reasoned judgments. We can see this, for example, by 
the fact that in some parts of the former Yugoslavia, the Milošević Rule 98bis 
decision was published and sold in bookshops.114 Moreover, even if we were to 
partially accept the argument that judgments principally serve the parties, and 
not the affected communities, we might argue, given the preponderance of 
appeals raised on allegations that the Trial Chamber failed to take relevant 
evidence into account or gave undue weight to some evidence or facts, that the 
current structure of judgments does not even live up to that limited promise.  
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Perhaps one of the more striking conclusions that can be drawn from the above 
analysis is that proof in international criminal trials is an area that remains beset 
by uncertainty. In many ways, this is surprising; one might have expected that, 
by the end of the Tribunals’ lifetimes, we would be able to identify reasonably 
consistent approaches to the evaluation of evidence; a more or less shared 
understanding of the standard of proof and what it requires, and clear structures 
for judgments and their scope. However, as illustrated above, these issues were 
still subject to debate and development, even in the twilight years of the 
Tribunals.  
